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D1 AJ VU ALL OVER AGAIN: HOW A GENERATION OF GAINS IN




The question of whether reporters should have the legal right to resist
complying with subpoenas predates the founding of the United States. The
first known American reporter punished for refusing to identify the source
of published information was Benjamin Franklin's brother, James, in 1722.'
Over the ensuing 250 years, government officials occasionally tussled with
reporters, seeking their cooperation in investigations and court cases. Re-
porters seldom cooperated. Two time periods, however, stand out for the
sheer volume of subpoenas served on the media-the late 1960s and early
1970s, when government officials aggressively went after political groups
and others deemed to be "subversive," and the last three years, when the
post-9/11 atmosphere caused federal and state governments to clamp down
on the public release of government information. This culture of conspiracy
has caused more reporters than ever to rely on anonymous sources.
The spate of subpoenas served on United States reporters by prosecu-
tors, defense counsel, and civil litigants in the federal courts over the last
three years is eerily reminiscent of the atmosphere of the late 1960s and
early 1970s. This article compares and contrasts these two periods. The first
section examines (1) what led to the spate of subpoenas served on journal-
ists during President Richard Nixon's administration, (2) the aftermath of
Branzburg v. Hayes2-the only United States Supreme Court case to address
the availability of a reporter's privilege-in 1972, (3) the failure of the
United States Congress to adopt a statutory privilege in the 1970s, and (4)
the thirty-year evolution of a sort of common law reporter's privilege that
* Lucy A. Dalglish is the Executive Director for the Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press. Dalglish earned a Juris Doctor degree from Vanderbilt University Law School in
1995, a Master of Studies law degree from Yale Law School in 1988, and a Bachelor of Arts
in journalism from the University of North Dakota in 1980.
** Casey Murray was a Legal Fellow at the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press from 2005-2006. Murray earned a Juris Doctor degree and a media law certificate from
the University of Kansas Law School in 2005 and a Bachelor of Arts in English from Mar-
quette University in 1999.
1. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 30 (H. Weld ed. 1848).
2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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seems to have dissolved in the last three years. The second section reviews
federal case law during the post-Branzburg years and tracks the evolution in
judicial thinking that initially provided a qualified privilege, but then began
to chip away at it.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGE
For most reporters, the issue of whether to protect sources is black and
white. They keep their promises. The most widely used Code of Ethics for
journalists today, first adopted in 1926 by Sigma Delta Chi (now the Society
of Professional Journalists), reminds reporters to "[a]lways question
sources' motives before promising anonymity. Clarify conditions attached to
any promise made in exchange for information. Keep promises."3 The
American Newspaper Guild adopted a canon in 1934 that required a "news-
paperman" to refuse to reveal his confidences before any court or investiga-
tive body.4
In the eyes of reporters, the arguments for a testimonial reporter's
privilege have not changed over the past 250 years. First, reporters argue
that they must be "independent." Reporters have credibility when they are
perceived as having independently collected and reported information.' If
they are perceived as being an agent of discovery for a plaintiff, a prosecu-
tor, or a defendant, who will trust them? Ultimately, sources will dry up and
journalists will not be able to do their jobs. Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in Branzburg recognized the need to protect the independence of the
news gathering and reporting process: "[c]ertainly, we do not hold ... that
state and federal authorities are free to annex the news media as an investi-
gative arm of the government. 6
Second, there is the "truth" argument. When sources dry up, the public
gets to hear only the party line. Just as with the other testimonial privileges
extended to doctors, lawyers, and clergy, public policy must sometimes en-
courage sources to come forth with the truth.7 When members of the public
cannot get accurate, independently gathered information about their gov-
ernment, they lose the ability to make informed choices at the ballot box.
3. SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETHICS, available at
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last visited July 3, 2006).
4. AMERICAN NEWSPAPER GUILD, CODE OF ETHICS, CANON 5 (1934) (now known as
The Newspaper Guild-Communications Workers of America).
5. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999); United
States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988).
6. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (internal quotations omitted).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1980) ("This
holding was based, in part, on the strong public policy supporting the unfettered communica-




The United States Supreme Court also recognized this important role of the
press in Branzburg:
Enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon
which an open society is premised, and a free press is thus indispensable
to a free society. Not only does the press enhance personal self-
fulfillment by providing people with the widest possible range of fact
and opinion, but it also is an incontestible precondition of self-
government.
8
Those are the altruistic reasons. Then, there is this very practical one: If
reporters do not resist, they will frequently find themselves in court as the
witness of choice. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals clearly understood
this concern in Gonzales v. National Broadcasting Co.9 The court wrote the
following:
If the parties to any lawsuit were free to subpoena the press at will, it
would likely become standard operating procedure for those litigating
against an entity that had been the subject of press attention to sift
through press files in search of information supporting their claims. The
resulting wholesale exposure of press files to litigant scrutiny would
burden the press with heavy costs of subpoena compliance, and could
otherwise impair its ability to perform, its duties-particularly if poten-
tial sources were deterred from speaking to the press, or insisted on re-
maining anonymous, because of the likelihood that they would be sucked
into litigation.'
°
The Gonzales court further explained that "[i]ncentives would also arise for
press entities to clean out files containing potentially valuable information
lest they incur substantial costs in the event of future subpoenas."
''
A. The Nixon Years: The Deterioration of the Media-Government Rela-
tionship
During the last years of the Johnson Administration and the first years
of the Nixon Administration, reporters assumed the First Amendment sup-
ported the notion of protection of confidential sources. They had had a string
of media-law victories in recent years-starting with New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,2 which cemented First Amendment rights for journalists in libel
cases.
8. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 726-27 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
9. 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
10. Id. at 35.
11. Id.
12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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But, there was no question that during this time the relationship be-
tween the media and the government began to deteriorate. Reporters became
more determined in the way they covered news stories. The Justice Depart-
ment, in turn, believed that there was a lot of suspicious activity going on-
particularly in the anti-war movement-and that the media could help them
investigate.'3
When President Nixon took office, the Justice Department became
even more aggressive. Subpoenas to journalists multiplied at alarming rates,
due largely to the Nixon Administration's efforts to monitor "subversive
groups," such as the Black Panther Party and the Students for a Democratic
Society.' 4 At the time, New York Times reporter Earl Caldwell wrote stories
about the Black Panthers' operations in Oakland. Caldwell, who was one of
the first very prominent black reporters to work for the national desk of The
New York Times, and who had gained notoriety for being on the Memphis
hotel balcony when Martin Luther King, Jr., was shot, was subpoenaed by a
federal grand jury to testify about events he had witnessed and people he
had spoken to while covering the Black Panthers. 5
These days, if a New York Times reporter is called to testify, the New
York Times will do what it takes to support that reporter. 16 It was not as
common for news organizations to go to the wall for reporters in the 1960s
and 1970s. Caldwell, believing his interests might conflict with the newspa-
per's at some point, hired his own lawyer, the noted Anthony Amsterdam. 7
Caldwell was not alone. The Justice Department and state prosecutors
targeted reporters across the country. The subpoenas seemed never-ending.
In October 1969, federal grand juries investigating the Weathermen faction
of the Students for a Democratic Society subpoenaed the unedited files and
unused pictures of Time, Life, and Newsweek magazines.' 8 A federal grand
jury in 1969 subpoenaed four Chicago newspapers, seeking files related to
13. See generally Sam J. Ervin, Jr., In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 233, 256-60 (1974). The article by the legendary Senator Ervin, who was deeply
involved in Congressional efforts to create a reporter's privilege in the 1970s, is the seminal
piece chronicling the legal and political battle facing journalists and members of Congress
following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg.
14. Lee Levine, The Law of Reporters, 15 CoMM. LAW. 1 (1997).
15. United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
16. Don Van Natta, Jr., Adam Liptak & Clifford J. Levy, The Miller Case: A Notebook,
a Cause, a Jail Cell, and a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at Al (Regarding the 2005 jail-
ing of reporter Judith Miller, the article provided the following quotation: "'She'd given
pledge of confidentiality,' said Arthur Sulzberger Jr., the publisher. 'She was prepared to
honor that. We were going to support her."').
17. Earl Caldwell, Ask Me. I Was the Test Case, 15 CoMM. LAW. 2, 20 (1997).
18. Henry Raymont, Magazines' Files Under Subpoena; Time, Life, and Newsweek
Data Involve S.D.S. Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1970, at 24.
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activities of the Weathermen and the Black Panthers. 9 In January 1970,
subpoenas were served on CBS to produce all tapes in its possession in-
volved in the making of a documentary on the Black Panther Party.20
And the subpoenas kept coming. From 1969 until July 1971, for exam-
ple, the NBC and CBS television networks and their wholly-owned affiliates
received a combined 121 subpoenas, the majority involving network cover-
age of militant and anti-war groups, demonstrations, and campus distur-
bances. 2' Field Enterprises was served with more than thirty subpoenas from
1969 to 1971.22
The federal case involving Caldwell was a catalyst in other ways.
Caldwell, a prominent reporter, had important friends in the business. The
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press ("Reporters Committee"),
formed in March 1970 by prominent New York and Washington, D.C. re-
porters, marked the beginning of an effort to support Caldwell and publicize
his plight.23 His case was combined with two state cases-one involving
Louisville Courier-Journal reporter Paul Branzburg and another involving
Providence, Rhode Island television journalist Paul Pappas-into a Supreme
Court case called Branzburg v. Hayes. In Branzburg's case, the issue was
whether the Kentucky shield law entitled a Louisville Courier-Journal re-
porter to protection from naming confidential sources to a grand jury.24
Branzburg had refused to disclose the identity of two men whose activities
in making the drug hashish he had witnessed and later reported.25 The ques-
tion in In re Pappas6 was whether a television reporter and photographer
could refuse to tell a state grand jury what he had observed while preparing
to film a police raid on a Black Panther Party headquarters in New Bedford,
Massachusetts.27
19. Id
20. Jack Gould, United States Seeks TV Film from Panther Show; United States Seeks
Panther Film C.B.S. Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1970, at 1.
21. Ervin, supra note 13, at 245 (citing Hearings on Freedom of the Press Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 56 (1972)).
22. Id. (citing Hearing on Newsman's Privilege Before the Subcomm. No. 3 of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 246 (1972)).
23. Floyd J. McKay, First Amendment Guerillas: Formative Years of the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 6 JOURNALISM & COMM. MONOGRAPHS 108-11 (2004).
24. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
25. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
26. 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), affd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972).
27. Id. at 298.
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B. Branzburg v. Hayes: No First Amendment Privilege for Reporters?
In 1972, the Supreme Court handed down a disappointing and shocking
decision to some First Amendment advocates. The Court held that reporters
do not have a First Amendment right to refuse to testify before a grand jury
regarding crimes they witnessed.28 In that regard, they are just like ordinary
citizens. But, the Supreme Court stated that Congress and the states were
free to pass "shield laws" that provide statutory protection for reporters and
their sources.29
The Branzburg case had an energizing effect on the legislative front,
particularly in the states. The Reporters Committee and other journalism
organizations went to work to convince Congress and state legislatures
about the necessity of "shield laws" to protect newsgathering. Although only
a handful of states had shield laws in 1972, today thirty-two states and the
District of Columbia have statutory protection in the form of "shield laws."3
Twelve of those states have absolute protection for confidential sources.3'
Another eighteen states, including Arkansas, have court decisions that pro-
vide varying levels of protection from subpoenas.32 Only Wyoming is off
those lists.33
State laws evolved to provide statutory protection for reporters and
their sources in the 1970s. But, in Congress it was another story. Between
1973 and 1978, ninety-nine bills were introduced in Congress. 34 None
passed-largely because "the media" could [not] decide what it wanted.35
Some hard-liners thought reporters should never turn the issue of source
protection over to Congress. These media analysts worried that getting Con-
28. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 699. The Court stated as follows:
The obligation to testify in response to grand jury subpoenas will not threaten
these sources not involved with criminal conduct and without information rele-
vant to grand jury investigations, and we cannot hold that the Constitution places
the sources in these two categories either above the law or beyond its reach.
Id.
29. Id. at 706.
30. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Agents of Discovery: A Report on
the Incidence of Subpoenas Served on the News Media in 2001 (2003), available at
http://www.rcfp.org/agents/shieldlaws.html (last visited June 15, 2006).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The state legislature in Connecticut passed a shield law on May 3, 2006, which
was signed into law on July 27, 2006. 2006 Conn. Acts 140 (Reg. Sess.).
34. Michael D. Saperstein, Jr., Comment, Federal Shield Law: Protecting Free Speech
or Endangering the Nation, 14 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 543, 559 (2006) (citing Wendy N.
Davis, The Squeeze on the Press: More Courts Are Forcing Reporters to Testify as Judges
Reconsider Media Privilege, 91 A.B.A. J. 23 (2005)).
35. Ervin, supra note 13, at 261, 270. "The divergence among legislators only reflected
the divergence in the press." Id. at 261.
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gress involved would begin the slippery slope of Congress legislating the
definition of a journalist. Plus, they worried that what Congress gives, it can
take away.36 Other groups said that any statutory protection must provide an
absolute privilege for confidential sources. 7 Some thought a qualified privi-
lege that protected journalists in most situations would be enough.38 In short,
it was a disorganized mess. This started thirty years of inconsistent rulings
and confusion among reporters as to what law they were operating under.
There were a couple of bright notes for reporters on the federal level-
never discount what a clever constitutional lawyer can pull off. Since
Branzburg was a plurality decision with a final vote in the court of five to
four, it was possible to craft some wiggle room. And, that is exactly what
creative First Amendment lawyers did. They pointed out that the decision
was actually a four-one-four ruling. In other words, four justices found abso-
lutely no reporter's privilege under the First Amendment, while four clearly
found one under the First Amendment. Justice Powell, however, tried to go
right down the middle. In a concurring opinion, he said the decision should
not be read to suggest that there is never a privilege for journalists-just that
the facts presented in the combined cases under Branzburg did not provide
for a privilege.39 The argument was that without Powell's limiting concur-
rence, the Supreme Court would not have found any constitutional reporter's
privilege. So, for thirty-two years, many subpoenaed reporters and their
lawyers convinced courts all over the country that Justice Powell's concur-
rence represented the true majority view.40
In other words, by using the Powell concurrence, the media crafted
some exceptions to Branzburg and, in some cases, used the balancing test
suggested by Justice Stewart's dissent.4' In such cases, courts typically
36. Id.at 271.
37. Resolutions calling for enactment of an absolute privilege were passed by the
American Society of Newspaper Editors and Sigma Delta Chi (now Society of Professional
Journalists) in November 1972 and by the Radio Television News Directors Association and
the American Newspaper Publishers Association (now Newspaper Association of America)
in December 1972. Hearings on Newsmen's Privilege Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 251, 301, 354 (1973).
38. Ervin, supra note 13, at 262.
39. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
40. See supra Section II.
41. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart stated the fol-
lowing:
Accordingly, when a reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury and reveal
confidences, I would hold that the government must (1) show that there is prob-
able cause to believe that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to
a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought
cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First Amendment




forced a journalist to testify only if there was an overriding public interest in
disclosure, which the court determined by deciding whether the information
sought was absolutely necessary to the case and whether there were no al-
ternative sources of the information.42
At the same time, the Justice Department crafted guidelines for when it
would subpoena a reporter that provided some protection for reporters'
rights. 3 Under the guidelines, approval for any federal subpoena of a re-
porter had to be approved by the United States Attorney General.' How-
ever, it remained difficult to evade a grand jury subpoena once the Justice
Department decided it needed an appearance by a reporter. Even under these
guidelines, a reporter would still go to jail now and again,45 but the situation
had improved greatly since the Nixon-era excesses of media subpoenas.
III. FEDERAL CASES ANALYZING BRANZBURG
After Branzburg, a legal fight ensued between media lawyers and liti-
gants seeking to have journalists testify. The media attorneys attempted to
focus the courts on the narrowness of Branzburg-by applying it only to
journalists called before a grand jury-and to focus on the qualified privi-
lege found in Justice Powell's necessary concurrence. Prosecutors and liti-
gants obviously focused on the plurality decision and endevoured to broaden
Branzburg' s majority.
Much of the legal analysis regarding Branzburg--currently being un-
done by cases such as McKevitt v. Pallasch4 t-arose from the decisions im-
mediately following it. Because there was such confusion regarding exactly
what Branzburg meant, the media knew the importance of setting a prece-
dent that narrowed the case as much as possible. In many ways, the media
had extraordinary success. In just over ten years, most federal courts had
Id.
42. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000); United States
v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181 (lst Cir. 1988); United States v. Cuthbertson,
630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th
Cir. 1977).
43. Ervin, supra note 13, at 252. United States Attorney General John Mitchell an-
nounced the guidelines at a meeting of the American Bar Association on August 10, 1970.
Mitchell Sets Rules Limiting Subpoenas Issued to Newsmen; Mitchell Sets Subpoena Rules to
Allay Growing Press Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1970, at 1.
44. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(e) (2006).
45. See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Paying the Price: A Recent
Census of Reporters Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Testify, available at
http://www.rcfp.org/jail.html (last visited June 15, 2006).
46. 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
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developed a qualified privilege in federal cases.47 Generally, courts applied a
qualified privilege that required journalists to testify in criminal cases while
generally refusing to require journalists to testify as third parties in civil
cases.4" In grand jury cases, courts would often not even apply the qualified
privilege. The following section will examine the ways in which courts
hearing cases immediately following Branzburg applied the privilege to
grand jury, criminal, and civil cases.
A. Grand Jury Cases
Immediately following Branzburg, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided Bursey v. United States.49 Here, the court examined journalists who
were direct witnesses of a Black Panther protest in which there was a threat
to kill the president." The government wanted to ask the reporters for in-
formation regarding the threat, as well as information regarding the work-
ings of their newspaper.5 The court severely limited the government's ques-
tioning and found "[a]ll speech, press, and associational relationships are
presumptively protected by the First Amendment; the burden rests on the
Government to establish that the particular expressions or relationships are
outside its reach."52 The court concluded that the government needed to find
a "substantial connection" between the information it sought and the "over-
riding governmental interest in the subject matter of the investigation," em-
phasizing that obtaining the information should not be "more drastic than
necessary."53
Using this template, the court found that the journalists did not have to
answer each and every question presented by the government:
47. John E. Osborn, The Reporter's Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the Empirical
Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 57, 67 (1985). Osborn
stated the following:
Many decisions in the wake of Branzburg have proven more favorable towards
the press, as lower courts strive to reconcile that decision's holding with their
own inclination to afford a measure of [F]irst[-A]mendment protection for the
media. The result has been the development of a flexible 'qualified' privilege,
where courts apply varying degrees of protection depending on the factual con-
text in which the dispute arises.
Id.
48. Id. at 68.
49. 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
50. Id. at 1065.
51. Id. at 1066-71.
52. Id. at 1082 (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971); Speiser v. Randall 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
53. Id. at 1083.
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The Ninth Circuit held that the questions dealing with threatened vio-
lence and the military interference were legitimate, but ruled the two
women could not be compelled to testify about the publication and dis-
tribution of Black Panther newspapers or pamphlets because those in-
quiries violated the [F]irst[-A]mendment rights of free association and
freedom of the press.
54
This case immediately answered the question of how much protection jour-
nalists would have while testifying in front of a grand jury.
Although Bursey was released the same day as the Branzburg decision,
the Bursey court was still able to examine its opinion in light of Branzburg
because of an immediate government appeal." The court concluded as fol-
lows: "We have reexamined our analysis of the factors involved in balanc-
ing the First[-]Amendment rights against the governmental interests asserted
to justify compelling answers to the questions here involved, and we have
concluded that the balance we struck is not impaired by Branzburg.' '16 The
court did not conclude that journalists had a privilege in grand jury situa-
tions. 7 Instead, the Bursey court applied a very low bar, requiring the gov-
ernment to show a "legitimate and compelling" interest in the information.5
This type of explanation of Branzburg became common. The media had the
least success in limiting testimony for journalists in front of grand juries, as
courts generally required reporters to testify. 9
In another decision released just after Branzburg, In re Bridge,6 a court
held a reporter in contempt when he would not answer a grand jury's ques-
tions about a story he wrote regarding bribery and the New Jersey Housing
Authority. 6 In his story, the reporter named his source but did not name the
person who had attempted to make a bribe.62 He spent twenty days in jail for
refusing to testify, and neither the New Jersey appellate court nor the United
54. Stephen R. Hofer, The Fallacy of Farber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitutional
Newsman s Privilege in Criminal Cases, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299, 319 (1979).
55. Bursey, 466 F.2d at 1091.
56. Id.
57. See id at 1090.
58. Hofer, supra note 54, at 319.
59. James C. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for
Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 725 (1975). "Thus far, however, no court since Branzburg
has applied the balancing test to excuse reporters from testifying as to the witnessing of a
crime[,] even though such information has been taken out of their stories." Id.
60. 295 A.2d 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 991 (1973).
Bridge was eventually superseded by statute. See In re Woodhaven Lumber & Mill Work,
589 A.2d 135 (N.J. 1991).
61. In re Bridge, 295 A.2d at 4.
62. Id. at 4-5.
[Vol. 29
REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
States Supreme Court stayed his contempt sentence. 6' Here, the court con-
cluded there was no privilege at all for a journalist testifying before a grand
jury.,
Since Branzburg dealt exclusively with grand jury testimony, courts
generally required journalists to testify. "In the seven years since the Su-
preme Court's 1972 decision, at least eleven federal and state court deci-
sions have been handed down that cite Branzburg as their authority for re-
jecting privilege claims in the grand jury context.""
The press had slightly more success when reporters faced grand jury
testimony in cases in which the media did not witness a potential crime, but
instead, received physical evidence. In these cases, courts tended to apply a
portion of Justice Powell's concurrence. For example, in In re Lewis,66 the
Ninth Circuit was faced with a government brief that attempted to apply a
very broad application of Branzburg. The government lawyers argued as
follows:
[T]he factual situation in tis [sic] case presents a far stronger case for the
application of the principle that newsmen are not immune from the obli-
gation of appearing before a grand jury and giving relevant testimony
with respect to criminal contact, even if that testimony requires the dis-
closure of a confidential source.67
Under this argument, the government claimed Branzburg nullified all
claim of a reporter's privilege and that the reporter would have no First
Amendment grounds to withhold the information from the grand jury.68 The
media failed to prevent the court from holding the reporter in contempt for
refusing to testify.69 However, the reporter's lawyers did convince the court
63. In re Matter of Bridge, 299 A.2d 78 (N.J. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Bridge v.
New Jersey, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
64. In re Bridge, 295 A.2d at 6. "We do not read the majority opinion in Branzburg as
requiring a balancing of interests test to determine when a reporter should be compelled to
testify." Id.
65. Hofer, supra note 54, at 318 (citing Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.
1975); In re Lewis, 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Powers, 4 MEDIAL. REP. (BNA) 1600
(Vt. Dist. Ct. 1978); Andrews v. Andreoli, 400 N.Y.S.2d 422 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); In re
Tierney, 328 So.2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Fisher v. Dan, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1973); In re McGowan, 298 A.2d 339 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); In re Bridge, 295
A.2d at 3).
66. 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974) (considering a case in which KPFK station manager
Will Lewis refused to turn over a document reportedly containing information about the
bombing of a governmental building from "The Weather Underground" and a tape recording
issued by "The Symbionese Liberation Army" regarding the Patty Hearst kidnapping).
67. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 27, In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Will Lewis,
501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974) (No. 74-2170).
68. Id.
69. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Will Lewis, 501 F.2d 418,421 (9th Cir. 1974).
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that he had a legitimate First Amendment privilege that, in this case, the
government had overcome.7"
The Bursey, Bridge, and Lewis decisions helped determine the limits of
what was left of the privilege for grand jury testimony. While journalists did
not even have a qualified privilege, the government was not free to question
journalists at will if the questions would violate the media's First Amend-
ment rights or if the grand jury was designed to harass the press.7 The gov-
ernment need only show a legitimate and compelling need for the informa-
tion to overcome the media's First Amendment rights.
By 2002, most federal circuits had determined that reporters had little
to no protection from grand jury questioning unless the media could show
that the grand jury had not acted in good faith. Most circuits gave the gov-
ernment broad power to compel testimony from journalists, requiring only a
showing of legitimate need for the information.7" Only the Third Circuit73
has applied a broader qualified privilege for grand jury cases.
B. Criminal Cases
The media had better results with post-indictment criminal cases. The
Supreme Court helped establish a qualified privilege in criminal cases by
refusing to grant certiorari in two cases that applied a privilege in reporter's
source cases immediately after Branzburg. For example, Farr v. Superior
Court74 set up a qualified privilege, and, although the appellate court's deci-
sion was rendered prior to Branzburg, the Supreme Court did not take the
case to clarify or correct Farr's interpretation of the reporter's privilege.75 In
Farr, a reporter violated a court's publicity order in the trial of Charles
Manson and would not identify his source.76 The governmental lawyers
seeking information from the journalist displayed the common tactic of
overemphasizing the breadth of Branzburg and misstating the reporter's
argument. The government argued that the reporter had claimed "an immu-
70. Id. at 423.
71. Id. This notion is based upon Justice Powell's concurrence in Branzburg, which
stated the following: "If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being
conducted in good faith he is not without remedy." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710
(1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
72. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The Reporter's Privilege (2002),
available at http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/index.html (last visited May 7, 2006).
73. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd
without opinion by equally divided court, 963 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992).
74. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
75. 409 U.S. 1011 (1972) (denying certiorari).
76. Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 66.
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nity from the requirement of all citizens to testify ... ."" In fact, the reporter
was just attempting to claim a privilege given to many members of society
such as doctors and priests. It also oversimplified Branzburg's holding by
suggesting that in Branzburg the Supreme Court "held that a reporter's free-
dom of speech and press was not abridged by requiring him to appear and
testify before a grand jury."78
Fortunately for the media, the appellate court ignored these arguments
and applied a balancing test that weighed the press's First Amendment right
to publish against the government's need for the information.79 In this case,
the court required the reporter to identify the source, but at least it applied a
balancing test and did not use the government's extensive view of
Branzburg.80
Just three years later, the Ninth Circuit determined conclusively that
Branzburg requires a balancing test in criminal cases. In Farr v. Pitchess,8'
the court stated, "[i]t is clear that Branzburg recognizes some First Amend-
ment protection of news sources. The language of the case likewise indi-
cates that the privilege is a limited or conditional one."82
Just seven years after Branzburg, courts tended toward finding a quali-
fied privilege in criminal cases.83 From 1972 to 1979, courts granted the
media immunity in fifteen of twenty-seven cases in which it was sought, and
it ordered disclosure in only nine.84 Courts tended to use the balancing test to
77. Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 9, Farr v. Super. Ct., 409 U.S. 1011 (1972)
(No. 71-1642).
78. Id. at 15.
79. Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 72. The court clearly stated the test as follows:
Where, as here, the impediment to the free flow of information is indirect by the
creation of a situation in which the press informants may be inhibited by the pos-
sibility that their identity will be revealed, the need for disclosure of [a] source
must be weighed to determine whether it is so compelling as to outbalance the
vital interest in [the] uninhibited flow of news.
Id.
80. Id. at 72-73.
81. 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975).
82. Id. at 467.
83. Hofer, supra note 54, at 320 ("As in the area of civil litigation, courts in criminal
cases generally seem to be acknowledging the existence of a conditional or qualified privi-
lege for the press.").
84. Id. at 320-21. "[C]ases in which courts have accepted first amendment claims of
newsman's privilege" are United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. DePalma, 466 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp.
229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Laughlin v. State, 323 So. 2d 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Florida v.
Morel, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2309 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1979); Florida v. Beattie, 4 MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA) 2150 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1979); Florida v. Petrantoni, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1554 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. 1978); Florida v. Hurston, 3 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2295 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978); People
v. Monroe, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (citing People v. Barnes, Indict. No.
3194/74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975)); People v. Marahan, 368 N.Y.S.2d 685 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975);
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award immunity if the confidential information was "collateral" and to re-
quire testimony if the confidential information was "relevant and material"
to the guilt or innocence of the party."
The idea that Branzburg gave reporters a qualified privilege in criminal
cases became more and more settled. By 1980, even the government lawyers
seeking journalists' testimonies had conceded that a qualified privilege ex-
isted. For example, the government lawyers in United States v. Cuthbert-
son," in their brief before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, stated that in Branzburg, "the court held that the Constitution con-
fers no special right on news reporters and news organizations to withhold
relevant evidence when disclosure is compelled by the overriding public
interest in the fair administration of law enforcement., 87 The court agreed,
holding that "journalists possess a qualified privilege not to divulge confi-
dential sources and not to disclose unpublished information in their posses-
sion in criminal cases. 88
Courts allowed this qualified privilege because they understood the
need for journalists to obtain information from anonymous sources. In 1980,
the Third Circuit heard a case that sounds very similar to the Judith Miller
8 9
situation. In United States v. Criden,9° a journalist was summoned as a wit-
ness in a criminal case and was held in contempt for refusing to say whether
she had a conversation with a person who had already told the court that
their conversation took place.9' Although the court ended up requiring the
journalist to testify-judging that the communication was no longer confi-
dential-it did lay out the logic and reasoning behind supporting a privilege
Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974); Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279
(Wis. 1978). Hofter, supra note 54, at 320-21.
Criminal cases in which courts have "rejected first amendment privilege claims" are
United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972); Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 69; State v.
Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812 (Kan. 1978); Michigan v. Smith, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1753
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1978); New Jersey v. De La Roche, 3 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2317 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1977); New York v. LeGrand, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1897 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1979); New York v. Zagarino, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1693 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); People v.
Dupree, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); In re Dan, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1975). Hofter, supra note 54, at 320-21.
85. Id. at 321 (citing State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812, 815 (Kan. 1978); People v. Mon-
roe, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d
429, 431 (Va. 1974)).
86. 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980) (explaining that third-party CBS refused to comply with
a court order directing it to submit materials for in camera inspection).
87. Brief of Appellee-Respondent at 29, United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d
Cir. 1980) (No. 80-1325).
88. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980).
89. See generally Van Natta, supra note 16.
90. 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980).
91. Id. at 349-50.
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for confidential sources.92 The court stated the following: "[T]here is a gen-
eral expectation in certain sectors of society that information flows more
freely from anonymous sources. Experience in the operation of such public
service facilities as hotels, restaurants, and common carriers shows that pro-
prietors often solicit from their customers anonymous information grading
the service received.,
93
In addition, the court understood that anonymous sources played an
important role in allowing the media to effectively monitor the government
for the people. As the so-called Fourth Estate, the media must inform the
public regarding its government's actions. The Criden court stated the fol-
lowing:
[C]ommunications media not only serve as the vehicle that widely dis-
perses information but also constitute an important instrument of democ-
racy that assists our officials in fashioning public policy. Without the
protection of the source, the cutting edge of this valuable societal in-
strument would be severely dulled and public participation in decision-
making severely restricted.94
Just ten years after Branzburg, most courts had established a qualified
privilege for journalists in criminal cases. 95 This federal, common law privi-
lege tended to follow Justice White's balancing test in his Branzburg con-
currence. Most courts required that the government show the information it
sought was relevant and material.96 In addition, a few courts also required
the government to show that the information sought was not available from
alternate sources.97 This balancing test was eventually picked up by most
circuits and even expanded by some.
As of 2002, most federal circuits have adapted the early legal doctrines
developed following Branzburg and apply a qualified privilege for the me-
dia in criminal cases. The First Circuit Court of Appeals applies a balancing
test requiring, generally, relevancy, admissibility, and specificity-that the
party seeking the information is not on a "general fishing expedition." 98 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has a three-part test (relevant, necessary,
and unavailable from alternate sources) and has found that the privilege is
weaker in criminal cases and in cases in which there is no confidentiality. 99
92. Id. at 355-60.
93. Id. at 356.
94. Id.
95. Hofer, supra note 54, at 320.
96. Id. at 321.
97. Id.
98. See United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1179 (1st Cir. 1988).
99. See Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999); see also United
States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983).
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In the Third Circuit, Cuthbertson's qualified privilege still applies.' The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also applies a qualified privilege; however,
it is less expansive than its privilege for civil cases.' The Ninth Circuit still
applies the qualified test it applied in Farr.112 The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has not expressly addressed the issue, but a United States district
court in Colorado found a qualified privilege. 3 The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals also applies a qualified privilege requiring relevancy, necessity,
and unavailability from other sources.' °4 In the Seventh Circuit, a qualified
privilege at one time applied, °5 but it appears that Judge Posner's McKe-
vitt.°6 decision has eliminated that privilege in cases not involving confiden-
tial sources.1 7
Not all federal circuits, however, apply a clear qualified privilege for
journalists in criminal cases. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found no
privilege at all for non-confidential information, and it remains unclear
whether one would even apply to confidential information.' 8 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has found that
the privilege exists only with regard to bad faith attempts to gain informa-
tion from the media. 0 9 However, this has likely changed following the
Miller"° decision. The Sixth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal have not
definitively addressed this issue."'
C. Civil Cases
Since Branzburg dealt exclusively with grand jury subpoenas, courts
have had more freedom to apply a stronger reporter's privilege in civil
cases. Civil cases tend to fall into two categories: when the media is called
as a third-party witness and when the media is a party to the civil action,
100. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980).
101. See In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1992).
102. Farr v. Pichess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975).
103. Re/Max Int'l Inc. v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 846 F. Supp. 910 (D. Colo.
1994).
104. See United States v. Blanton, 730 F.2d 1425 (11 th Cir. 1994).
105. See United States v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 1256 (7th Cir. 1995).
106. 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
107. See, e.g., Patterson v. Burge, No. 03 C 4433, 2005 WL 43240, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6,
2005); Hobley v. Burge, 223 F.R.D. 499, 502 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Solaia Tech., LLC v. Rock-
well Automation, Inc., No. 03 C 6904, 2003 WL 22597611, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2003).
108. See United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998).
109. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d
1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
110. See generally Van Natta, supra note 16.
111. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The Reporter's Privilege, available
at http://www.rcfp.org/cgi-local/privilege/compare.cgi?searchtype=compare&outline=3C2&
06=on&08=on (last visited May 7, 2006).
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such as a defamation action. As would be expected, courts have taken very
different tactics when faced with these types of cases. Generally, however,
courts are much more likely to find a reporter's privilege when the media is
called as a third-party witness.
The first court to address Branzburg's effect on civil litigation was the
Second Circuit in Baker v. F & F Investment. 12 The court concluded that
under Branzburg, although "federal law does not recognize an absolute or
conditional journalist's testimonial 'privilege,' neither does federal law re-
quire disclosure of confidential sources in each and every case, both civil
and criminal, in which the issue is raised.' ' . With this conclusion, the court
applied a qualified privilege and refused to force the journalist to testify
because it concluded (1) the plaintiff had not exhausted alternate sources or
shown the relevance of the information sought and (2) his claim did not go
to the heart of the matter.
4
These three factors were to become common among courts looking to
establish a privilege in civil cases-and would become a part of any so-
called federal common law reporter's privilege. Significantly, the court also
recognized the dangers of involving the media in civil litigation:
Compelled disclosure of confidential sources unquestionably threatens a
journalist's ability to secure information that is made available to him
only on a confidential basis .... The deterrent effect such disclosure is
likely to have upon future undercover investigative reporting... threat-
ens freedom of the press and the public's need to be informed.' 5
Just one year after Branzburg, a federal court explicitly distinguished
the differences between civil cases and criminal cases with regard to the
reporter's privilege. In Democratic National Committee v. McCord,"6 the
court, while quoting James Madison, applied a qualified privilege requiring
the party seeking the information to exhaust alternate sources and show that
the information is material to the case." 7 This court, like the Baker court,
recognized that allowing civil litigants to use the media for discovery with-
out applying a qualified privilege would have a vast "chilling effect ... on
the flow of information to the press, and so to the public.""' This acknowl-
112. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972) (calling a reporter to reveal his source for a story about
"blockbusting" in Chicago to advance a civil suit).
113. Id.at781.
114. Goodale, supra note 59, at 737.
115. Baker, 470 F.2d at 782 (internal quotations omitted).
116. 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (subpoenaing tapes, recordings, drafts, and nu-
merous other pieces of information from numerous media outlets that had reported on the
Watergate break-in).
117. Id. at 1399 ("A popular government without popular information or the means of
acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy or perhaps both.").
118. Id. at 1397.
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edgment of the danger of allowing litigants to use the press would become
more common as more and more courts applied Branzburg to civil cases.
The courts that looked in this area tended to focus on the limiting lan-
guage of Branzburg."9 Armed with this way to protect the media, many
federal courts in the mid-1970s greatly expanded the privilege in civil cases.
A Tenth Circuit case upheld this qualified privilege and extended its reach
to the independent producer of a documentary film. 120 A Fourth Circuit deci-
sion, United States v. Steelhammer,2' required journalists to testify because
it concluded that the journalists were not protecting confidential sources, but
it applied the qualified privilege in coming to that conclusion. 2 2 "In all,
twenty-eight reported post-Branzburg civil cases in which information was
sought from a nonlitigant journalist have been decided in the state and fed-
eral courts. In only three cases were the reporters required to testify.' ' 23 Of
those three, only Steelhammer involved a federal court.
During the same time, federal courts found a common law privilege in
civil cases developing along with a constitutional privilege found in
Branzburg. The Third Circuit, in Riley v. City of Chester,124 concluded "that
journalists have a federal common law privilege, albeit qualified, to refuse
to divulge their sources."'2 5 The court cited numerous cases'26 supporting its
119. Hofer, supra note 54, at 314.
120. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433,433 (10th Cir. 1977).
121. 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976).
122. See id. at 374-75.
123. Hofer, supra note 54, at 317-18 (citing Baker v. F.S.F. Ins., 470 F.2d 778, 778 (2d
Cir. 1972); Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373; Poirier v. Carson, 537 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1976);
Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Gulliver's Periodicals Ltd. v. Charles Levy
Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Citicorp v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 4
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Consumers Union, 4 MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA) 2119 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Altemose Constr. Co. v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 443
F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.
1976); Apicella v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389
F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394,
1394 (D.D.C. 1973); Conn. State Bd. of Labor Relations v. Fagin, 370 A.2d 1095 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1976); Coira v. Depoo Hosp., 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1692 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978);
Schwartz v. Almart Stores, 42 Fla. Supp. 165, 166 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1975); Winegard v. Oxber-
ger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977); Dumez v. Hauma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 341
So. 2d 1206 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Opinion of the Justices, 2 MEDIAL. REP. (BNA) 2083 (N.H.
1977); MacKay v. Driscoll, 3 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); Davis v.
Davis, 386 N.Y.S.2d 992 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1976); Forest Hills Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 302
N.E.2d 593 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1973); Dallas Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Mouer, 533 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976); Amato v. Fellner, 4 MEDIAL. REP. (BNA) 1552 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1978).
124. 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979).
125. Id. at 715.
126. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436 (10th Cir. 1977); Baker, 470
F.2d at 782; Gulliver's Periodicals Ltd., 435 F. Supp. at 1203; Zerilli v. Bell, 458 F. Supp.




position, including Baker, to show that a qualified privilege had been
built.127 The common law, Riley found, required the "balance on one hand
[of] the policies [that] give rise to the privilege and their applicability to the
facts at hand against the need for the evidence sought to be obtained in the
case at hand.' 12' Along with the balancing test, the court concluded that the
party seeking the information needed to show the materiality and relevance
of the information, as well as the fact that there was no other source for the
information.
29
Riley was not followed by other circuits and was called into question
by a few courts, 30 but it was never overturned. Even so, the court's idea of
balancing the interests would play an important role in developing the fed-
eral common law privilege. This step could prevent a plaintiff who had
overcome the privilege from being able to receive the information because
the media's interest would outweigh the litigant's interest in the informa-
tion.'3 '
Surprisingly, journalists have not faced extra difficulties when fighting
for a privilege in defamation cases. Courts have used Branzburg, as well as
Garland v. Torre,3 2 to apply a qualified privilege to journalists. "The test
applied by [the court in] Garland is very similar to the one Justice Stewart
later articulated in his Branzburg dissent."'' 33 The test requires that the party
seeking information show that the information is relevant, that the party has
exhausted alternate sources of the information, and that the information re-
quested goes "to the heart of the matter."' 34 Courts facing a claim of privi-
lege in a defamation action tended to apply the qualified privilege that
started in Garland and was affirmed in Branzburg.
For example, in Carey v. Hume,'35 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia stated that "it appears to us that Branzburg, in language if not
in holding, left intact, insofar as civil litigation is concerned, the approach
127. Riley, 612 F.2d at 715.
128. Id. at 716.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Grand Jury Empaneled Feb. 5, 1999, 99 F.
Supp. 2d 496 (D.N.J. 2000).
131. See, e.g., Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 299, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dis-
senting) ("In this case, the panel never balanced the public and private interests.... [T]he
panel's arid two-factor test allows the exigencies of even the most trivial litigation to trump
core First[-]Amendment values ... ").
132. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958) (involving actress Judy Garland, who sought to have a
CBS journalist name his sources about who called her overweight).
133. Goodale, supra note 59, at 737.
134. Id. at 738.
135. 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (involving litigant who sought the identity of a source




taken in Garland."'36 The court applied the balancing test from Garland and
concluded that the information requested went to the heart of the matter. 37
But, even while rejecting the privilege, the court made sure that the journal-
ist's interests would be protected in further decisions, stating as follows:
"The courts must always be alert to the possibilities of limiting impinge-
ments upon press freedom to the minimum; and[,] one way of doing so is to
make compelled disclosure by a journalist a last resort after pursuit of other
opportunities has failed ... 138
Courts were also careful to prevent a plaintiff from suing for libel in an
effort to find confidential sources. In Cervantes v. Time, Inc.,139 the Eighth
Circuit held that "there must be a substantial state interest present before the
court will require the disclosure of a newsman's source. 40 If there is no
probability of the plaintiffs success in the action, no disclosure is re-
quired., 14' This case has also been used to find a common law reporter's
privilege. 142 However, even though courts apply a qualified privilege, it usu-
ally ends up being a hollow victory for the media as courts often require the
disclosure of information in defamation actions because they conclude that
the identity of the source goes to the heart of the claim.
As of 2002, most federal circuits had installed a strong, common law
qualified reporter's privilege. The First Circuit applies the balancing test,
but has found fewer First Amendment interests in cases without confidenti-
ality. 43 The Second Circuit provides a strong privilege for confidential in-
formation'" and a somewhat weaker privilege when the information sought
is nonconfidential 45 The Third Circuit requires a qualified privilege, but the
civil litigant seeking the information must show a much stronger case than
criminal litigants. 46 As recently as 2000, the Fourth Circuit had reaffirmed a
strong qualified privilege in civil cases. 147 The Fifth Circuit uses the Gar-
land balancing test in civil cases for both confidential and nonconfidential
cases. 48 The Sixth, 149 Seventh, 5 ° and Eighth'5 ' Circuits have less case law in
136. Id. at 636.
137. Id. at 636-37.
138. Id. at 639.
139. 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972).
140. Goodale, supra note 59, at 740 (citing Cervantes, 464 F.2d 986).
141. Id. (citing Cervantes, 464 F.2d 986).
142. See generally Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979).
143. See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998).
144. See United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983).
145. Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999).
146. See Parson v. Watson, 778 F. Supp. 214 (D. Del. 1991).
147. Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 282 (4th Cir. 2000).
148. See Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980).
149. See NLRB v. Midland Daily News, 151 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1998).
150. See Wamell v. Ford Motor Co., 183 F.R.D. 624 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
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this area, but the cases they have decided support the qualified privilege.
The Ninth Circuit follows Farr in civil and criminal cases but has found that
the privilege should defeat the litigant's interest in disclosure.'52 The Tenth
Circuit still follows Silkwood's balancing test. In the Eleventh Circuit, the
courts have found that the reporter's interest in having confidential sources
often outweighs a litigant's interest in the information.'53 And, finally, the
District of Columbia Circuit found that in an "ordinary case," the privilege
should prevail.154 Generally, the legal consensus after Branzburg has estab-
lished a qualified privilege.
Many decisions in the wake of Branzburg have proven more favorable
toward the press as lower courts strive to reconcile that decision's holding
with their own inclination to afford a measure of First Amendment protec-
tion for the media. The result has been the development of a flexible 'quali-
fied' privilege in which courts apply varying degrees of protection depend-
ing on the factual context in which a dispute arises.
D. Department of Justice Guidelines
The interpretations of Branzburg favorable toward the media were not
the only reasons that subpoenas and jailings of journalists declined so stead-
ily after reaching its heights in the late 1960s. Responding to criticism about
the large number of journalists being compelled to testify in criminal cases,
the Department of Justice instituted guidelines for when and how a Justice
Department agent could subpoena a journalist. Perhaps more than anything,
these guidelines helped stem the tide of journalists testifying.
Issued on August 10, 1970, the "Guidelines for Subpoenas to the News
Media"'56 provided guidance for issuing subpoenas to journalists. In October
1973, Attorney General Elliot Richardson turned the guidelines into formal
regulations. 5 7 They have been amended a few times since then, and they
now require "reasonable attempts" to obtain the information from alternate
sources,158 and they require the attorneys general to negotiate with the me-
dia.'59 No subpoena will be issued without the "express authorization" of the
151. See Cont'l Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer Broad. Co., 583 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
152. See Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 416 (9th Cir. 1995).
153. See Kidwell v. McCutcheon, 962 F. Supp. 1477 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
154. See Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
155. Osborn, supra note 47, at 67.
156. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2006).
157. Policy Regarding Issuance of Subpoenas to and Interrogation, Indictment, or Arrest
of Members of the News Media, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,588, 29,589 (Oct. 26, 1973) (codified at 28
C.F.R. § 50.10).
158. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(b) (2006).
159. Id. § 50.10(c).
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Attorney General. 6 ° In addition, when making the request to the Attorney
General, the government attorneys must show that the information sought is
"essential" to both civil and criminal cases 6' and is as limited as possible.16 2
Limited by these guidelines, attorneys for the Department of Justice
began to cut back on the subpoenas issued to journalists. On March 1, 1973,
the Department of Justice issued a memo detailing the effects of the guide-
lines.'63 It found only two situations between August 1970 and March 1973
in which "negotiations with the newsman were unsuccessful[,] and a divi-
sion of the Department, believing that the information was essential to a
successful investigation, forwarded its request for a subpoena to the Attor-
ney General."'" In both cases, the subpoena request was authorized.'6 5
However, there were "seven other situations in which the Department de-
termined that conditions set forth in the Guidelines were not satisfied and
that subpoenas should not be requested."'66
Officially, the Department of Justice was proud of the guidelines. Dur-
ing the mid-1970s, many Justice Department spokesmen made comments
about the importance of the guidelines in fixing tension between the media
and government. For example, in 1973, John Hushen, the director of public
information for the Department of Justice, told the Detroit Press Club the
following:
The key to resolving the problem was to . . . agree that the Attorney
General personally had to authorize a subpoena to a reporter, not some
Assistant [United States] Attorney out in the country who was blithely
unaware of the impact he was having nationally by issuing a subpoena
for a reporter's notes or negatives. Almost overnight, a problem [that]
had been creating extreme friction between the news media and the Fed-
eral Government disappeared. Our guidelines have been so successful, in
fact, that we have encouraged state governments to consider them as a
model.'
67
Richardson, then Attorney General, also spoke of the positive results gained
from the guidelines in an August 1973 speech before the House of Delegates
American Bar Association. He stated as follows:
160. Id. § 50.10(e).
161. Id. § 50.10(f)(1)-(2).
162. Id. § 50.10(f)(6).
163. Memorandum Re: Department of Justice Requests for Subpoenas to Newsman Since




167. John W. Hushen, Remarks Before the Detroit Chapter of Sigma Delta Chi at the
Detroit Press Club (Oct. 4, 1973).
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Reporters have a primary responsibility to the public, just as we do. This
responsibility can lead them into controversial situations. But[,] the pro-
cedural power of the Department should never be used-not even by in-
direction or innuendo-in a way that could weaken the exercise of First[-
]Amendment rights .... [The guidelines] have worked so well that only
[thirteen] subpoenas have been issued[,] and only two of those were con-
tested. These guidelines have been viewed as a model for the nation.
168
During his confirmation hearings, Edward Levi, who replaced Richardson as
Attorney General, also stated his strong support for the guidelines:
I would think that one would be very cautious before permitting the call-
ing of the newspaper person before a Grand Jury to divulge sources. It
would have to mean that there was a pressing need for it, that there was
no other way of finding out important information with respect to a
really important criminal matter, and I would think that presumptively
one would be against it .... So[,] I am more content, fiankly or other-
wise[,] to feel that it is not an absolute privilege, but it is certainly, pre-
sumptively a privilege, and therefore one would be very careful before
abusing the limited right to call newspaper men or women before the
Grand Jury. 1
69
While the public face of the Department of Justice overwhelmingly
supported the guidelines, local United States attorneys often seemed to have
a much narrower view of their importance. Away from the public eye in
Washington, the guidelines remained guidelines, and would have little to no
effect if the attorneys issuing the subpoenas did not want to follow them. In
fact, to allow the guidelines to become law would, according to one attorney
general, "prove catastrophic."' 7 ° In other words, while the higher office of
the Attorney General maintains that the guidelines are vitally important, the
United States Attorneys have the ability to ignore the guidelines as they
deem necessary.
Although the guidelines did work to stem the tide of subpoenas, they
certainly did not turn out to be the silver bullet to solve this issue, as their
supporters claimed them to be. Failure to follow the guidelines is grounds
for "administrative reprimand" or "appropriate action," and they "are not
intended to create or recognize any legally enforceable right in any per-
168. Elliot L. Richardson, Address Before the House of Delegates, American Bar Asso-
ciation (Aug. 8, 1973).
169. Nomination of Edward Hirsch Levi to Be Attorney General: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. (1975) (statement of Levi).
170. Brief of Appellee at 26, In re Grand Jury Proceeding of Will Lewis, 501 F.2d 418
(9th Cir. 410) (No. 74-2170).
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son."'' In fact, the Department of Justice opposed any codification-as in a
federal shield law-of its guidelines after first introducing them.'72
This feeling has not changed since the 1970s. Testifying in 2005 before
the Senate Judiciary Committee for the Department of Justice, United States
Attorney for the Southern District of Texas, Chuck Rosenberg, specifically
stated the department's opposition to turning the guidelines into law.'73 He
said the department had a "fundamental objection to the principle of a re-
porter's privilege as an exception to every citizen's duty to give testimony in
a federal criminal proceeding."'74 In addition, he testified that codifying the
guidelines would harm national security because it "imposes inflexible,
mandatory standards in lieu of existing voluntary guidelines that can be
adapted to changing circumstances."' 75
Without the support of the Department of Justice, passing a federal
shield law with an absolute privilege will be impossible, and even passing a
qualified privilege will remain difficult. What remains is for media lawyers
to continue to fight for the qualified privilege, which developed in grand
jury, civil, and criminal cases immediately after Branzburg.
IV. BRANZBURG TODAY
A. The Perfect Storm: A Return to the Nixon Era Privilege
1. McKevitt v. Pallasch
176
Three years ago, the perfect storm that devastated the federal reporter's
privilege started gathering. Three newspaper reporters in Chicago were
working on a book about terrorism in Ireland. 177 One of their sources was a
FBI informant who had been called as a witness in Ireland in a case against
an alleged terrorist.'78 The interview with the informant had been taped. '
7
Defense counsel in Ireland wanted the tape because they thought it might
contain information that could impeach the informant on the witness
171. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(n) (2006).
172. Jeffrey S. Nestler, The Underprivileged Profession: The Case for Supreme Court
Recognition of the Journalist's Privilege, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 201, 233 ("And, despite the
Guidelines, the Justice Department does not support the protection of journalists.").
173. Casey Murray, Sparring over a Shield Law, NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Fall 2005, at
15.
174. Id.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).





stand. 80 The Irish court went to a United States district court in Chicago for
a subpoena ordering the reporters to turn over their tape.'
8'
The reporters resisted but lost. They asked the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit for a stay, but it was denied. 2 The reporters turned the tape
over to the FBI, which redacted the tape before sending it to Ireland.8 3 The
reporters thought the case had ended with little "damage" done to the law of
the reporter's privilege."8 But, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit
issued an opinion anyway.8 5 He had no briefs before him and had heard no
arguments,18 6 but Posner issued an opinion that essentially said courts that
use Branzburg to fashion a reporter's privilege "may be skating on thin
ice."'
187
Posner is an unusually influential judge, and the rest of the federal ju-
diciary has lined up behind him to deny reporter's privilege cases for the last
three years. 8 8 Any suggestion that a First Amendment argument has been
developing over the past thirty years in the federal courts has been collaps-
ing.
2. Post 9/11 Secrecy
All the while, the perfect storm continued to pick up velocity. In the
post-9/11 world, the number of secrets kept by the federal government has
soared. For example, the number of documents classified as secret since
9/11 has more than doubled over the last five years.' 89 In 2004, the federal
government classified 15.6 million documents, almost double the 8.6 mil-
lion new documents classified as recently as 2001.190 And, in 2004, federal
agencies spent a record $148 creating and storing new secrets for each one
dollar spent declassifying old secrets. 9' Overall, the government spent $7.2
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 531.
183. Wendy Tannenbaum, Forfeited Interview Tapes Screened by FBI, NEWS MEDIA &
THE LAW, Summer 2003, at 47.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 531.
187. Id. at 532-33.
188. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Special
Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2001); People v. Combest, 828 N.E.2d 583, 587 (N.Y.
2005).
189. Secrecy Report Card 2005: Quantitative Indicators of Secrecy in the Federal Gov-
ernment, available at http://www.openthegovemment.org/otg/SRC2005.pdf (last visited May





billion in 2004, stamping 15.6 million documents "top secret," "secret," or
"confidential.' ' 92 In the same year, the number of pages declassified de-
clined for the fourth straight year to 28.4 million. 93 In 2001, 100 million
pages were declassified--down from the record 204 million pages declassi-
fied in 1997.' 94
Requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act have
quadrupled over the last six years to more than four million in 2004, far out-
pacing the government's resources to handle those requests. 95 Nearly two-
thirds of the 7,045 federal advisory committee meetings last year were
closed to the public, 96 undermining the thrust of the law 197 that created the
committees over thirty years ago to provide open scientific and technical
advice to the government.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approved 1,754 requests
from law enforcement officials in 2004 to conduct surveillance on foreign
nationals within the United States, almost double the number it issued four
years earlier. 98 The secret court approved all of the requests for warrants,
according to the report. 99 No one argues that all information held by the
federal government should be released to the public. But, a lot of informa-
tion that can be used by terrorists to do harm can also be used by citizens to
make their communities safer and healthier. Because of this obsession with
secrecy, long-time Washington correspondents report that high-level ad-
ministration sources have dried up. No one is "off message.""
The result is that right now there are more federal subpoenas pending
than at any time since the 1970s. In fact, at one point in October 2004, there
were more than twenty-one subpoenas pending in the federal courts seeking
the identities of confidential sources. 20 ' This perfect storm has led the privi-





195. Secrecy Report Card 2005, supra note 189.
196. Id.
197. Federal Advisory Committee Act § 2, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006).
198. Rebecca Carr, New Report Shows Government Secrecy Growing Fast, Cox NEWS
SERVICES (Sept. 4, 2005), available at http://www.coxwashington.com/news/content/
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199. Secrecy Report Card 2005, supra note 189, at 6.
200. Rachel Smolkin, Under Fire, Am. JOuRNALIsM REV., Feb./Mar. 2005, available at
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Amidst this perfect storm, the debate over the reporter's privilege con-
tinues to rage. Beginning with the well-publicized saga of New York Times
reporter Judith Miller, 2 and continuing on to controversial articles based on
confidential sources that exposed the misdeeds of the current administration
with regard to secret prisons. 3 and secret surveillance,2" the debate over a
reporter's privilege is as hot as it ever was in the 1960s and 1970s. This at-
mosphere-in which some respected conservative commentators have seri-
ously called for the jailing of reporters for writing stories.. 5 or for charging
reporters with treason under the Espionage Acte 6-- may be helping to bring
about an end to any judicial respect afforded to a federal reporter's privilege
developed under the First Amendment or through federal common law. This
current argument may weaken the work done by the media in the years im-
mediately following Branzburg.
Up until 2003 and the McKevitt decision, most courts accepted the
qualified federal privilege that Branzburg provided for journalists. But,
Judge Posner's comment that courts relying on the case for a reporter's
privilege "may be skating on thin ice ' 27 drastically changed the formula-
tions. Since then, the media has lost much of the ground it gained since
Branzburg.
B. Cleaning up After the Storm: How Courts Today Deal with the Re-
porter's Privilege
Most significantly, a three-judge panel from the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals could not agree on whether any kind of privilege exists for
a grand-jury situation. In the well-publicized case In re Miller,08 one federal
judge found a privilege existed, one felt the question did not need to be an-
swered, and one found that nothing had changed since Branzburg and that
202. Van Natta, supra note 16.
203. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
2005, at Al.
204. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets United States Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
205. Bennett: Pulitzer Winners Risen, Lichtblau, Priest 'Worthy of Jail,' EDITOR &
PUBLISHER, Apr. 18, 2006, available at http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news
/article display.jsp?vnucontentid=1002345921 (last visited May 7, 2006).
206. Gabriel Schoenfeld, Has the New York Times Violated the Espionage Act,
COMMENTARY MAG., Mar. 2006, available at http://www.commentarymagazine.com/
article.asp?aid=12103025_1#2foot (last visited May 7, 2006).
207. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532-33 (7th Cir. 2003).




there should be no reporter's privilege. °9 The media tried to explain the
massive change in case law since Branzburg was decided, stating as fol-
lows: "There is now an overwhelming and almost total consensus in this
country that a reporter's privilege exists and must be protected., 210 How-
ever, the prosecutor seeking the information argued that "there is no consti-
tutional or common law reporter's privilege to resist compliance with a
grand jury subpoena.",
2 11
District Judge David B. Sentelle, in his concurring opinion, agreed with
the government in finding that no significant changes in the law had oc-
curred since Branzburg.2?1 2 He found it "indisputable that the High Court
rejected a common law privilege in the same breath as its rejection of such a
privilege based on the First Amendment. 2 13 Although no other judge in the
panel agreed with that part of his ruling, the fact that a federal judge is now
finding no privilege at all is telling regarding the current state of the privi-
lege.
In addition, the Supreme Court refused to hear the case, lending cre-
dence to the idea that it supports the limiting of the privilege in grand jury
situations. But, the real story is that an American journalist spent eighty-five
days in prison because she talked to a source and did not want to break her
promise to keep his identity secret. The story, of course, will not end there.
Miller's source, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the former chief of staff of Vice
President Dick Cheney, was indicted on charges of perjury, obstruction of
justice, and lying to the FBI.21" His defense appears to rely upon the testi-
mony of journalists, which will inevitably lead to another round of argu-
ments over the federal reporter's privilege.2 5
As the Miller and Libby cases show, the privilege could be losing its ef-
fectiveness for grand jury and criminal testimony. But, even more concern-
ing is that it is even being weakened in its strongest area, civil cases. In an-
other case before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
209. See generally In re Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (Judge David B. Sentelle found no privi-
lege, Judge David S. Tatel found a privilege existed, and Judge Karen L. Henderson would
not have reached the question.).
210. Brief of Appellant at 33, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 04-3138 to 04-3140).
211. Id. at34.
212. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 978 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Sen-
telle, J., concurring).
213. Id. at 977.
214. David Stout, Libby Resigns His Post: Rove's Fate Uncertain, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28,
2005, at Al.




Lee v. Department of Justice,2 16 the party seeking the information had over-
come the privilege and was entitled to discovery. 2 7 Although it applied the
qualified privilege, the court did not weigh the need for disclosure against
the First Amendment values at stake.2t 8 Instead, it concluded that because
the plaintiff had a case that appeared to need journalists to tell who provided
information, the privilege had been overcome. 2 9 An amicus brief explained
this holding as follows: "[In] a highly regulated world, a privilege that can
be defeated by an allegation of some illegality-and colorable allegation are
all that is needed, because decision on press subpoenas will typically be
made before the plaintiffs case is tested on summary judgment-is tanta-
mount to no privilege at all. 22°
Judge Tatel's dissent, which would have brought the case to the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit en banc, recognized this problem.22' Nonetheless,
the full court dismissed those concerns, and the Supreme Court did not grant
certiorari-in effect subscribing to this notion.222
The First Circuit has also stepped back from accepting a qualified
privilege. In a case involving a television reporter who refused to disclose
his source of a leaked FBI videotape, the court concluded that Branzburg
"flatly rejected any notion of a general-purpose reporter's privilege for con-
fidential sources, whether by virtue of the First Amendment or of a newly
hewn common law privilege., 223 The case also called Farr an "elderly" case
limiting Branzburg to grand juries-implying that idea was out-of-date. 224 It
then positively quoted McKevitt.225 The court concluded that, if there was a
privilege, the government had overcome it.226 But, in a greater sense, it
showcased another step backward from the strides made by media lawyers
following Branzburg.
McKevitt has also altered the privilege law in the Seventh Circuit. If the
reporter's information is not confidential, the courts have refused to apply
216. 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (involving a Privacy Act action brought by nuclear
scientist whose identity was leaked by government agents to reporters with regard to an al-
leged selling of nuclear secrets to the Chinese government).
217. See id. at 61.
218. See generally id.
219. Seeid. at 60.
220. Brief for ABC, Inc. as Amici Curiae, Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (No. 04-5301).
221. See Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 299, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
222. Drogin v. Lee, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006).
223. In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2004) (involving television
reporter who refused to name the source of an FBI tape he aired showing a local government
official taking a bribe).
224. Id. at 44-45.
225. Id. at 45.
226. Id. at 47.
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any privilege and require that only the government make the same showing
it would make for any subpoena.227
All of this has caused a dramatic spike in federal subpoenas. The De-
partment of Justice has recently subpoenaed at least seven reporters in high-
profile cases, 22 and in 2006 it subpoenaed two reporters from the San Fran-
cisco Chronicle over their articles and book about a baseball player's al-
leged steroid use.229 Clearly, the country has reached another breaking point
for the idea of the reporter's privilege.
V. CONCLUSION
Even amidst this dark era for the privilege, encouraging signs have
emerged. The lack of a strong privilege has not prevented some journalists
from doing exceptional investigative work. Priest,23° Lichtblau, and Risen
have shown that investigative reporting can still take place. But, there re-
mains the question of the stories that are not written because sources worry
that the journalists will not be able to protect them.
Fortunately for sources, journalists are beginning to do a much better
job coming together and explaining the need for a privilege. Unlike the
1970s when media organizations fought among themselves, they have begun
to speak with one voice. During the 109th Congress, the United States Sen-
ate and House of Representatives introduced reporter's shield laws provid-
ing varying degrees of privilege in all situations that would not have been
enough for most media organizations thirty years ago.232 Journalists today,
however, have realized the changing atmosphere and the importance of get-
ting some protection for journalists.233
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